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Air Bag Litigation: Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines
INTRODUCTION
Each year an estimated 44,000 Americans are killed, and another
two million injured, as a result of automobile accidents. 1 These
figures represent the high risks of death or incapacity to a significant
percentage of the country's population through the use of the
automobile. 2
Automobile manufacturers have a legal duty to provide American
consumers with a reasonably safe product.3 Consumers, relying on
this, believe that their cars are sufficiently equipped to protect them
in the event of an accident. One question which arises in light of
their legal duty is why auto makers have failed to provide consumers
with the "air bag system,"4 a proven safety device, when the techno-
logical means to do so have been available for over a decade? 5 Ex-
perts estimate that this device could save over 9,000 lives and prevent
1. Time Fbr 'Passive Restraint,' L.A. Daily J., Dec. 2, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
2. Id. Additionally, it currently costs $57 billion a year in insurance, medical
costs, and lost taxes as a result of the high accident rate. Id.
3. 1 R. GOODMAN AND THE CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIA-
BILITY § 1.4, at 7 (2d ed. 1983) ("the manufacturer must design his product so that it is
safe for any reasonably foreseeable use"). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 645 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Air bag systems consist of five components which function automatically
in crashes to protect occupants of the vehicle. The components are:
1) the sensors, which activate the system upon a specific impact to the car;
2) the wire, which transmits the triggering impulse to the rest of the
system;
3) the inflators, which generate the gas;
4) the air bags, which balloon out into the passenger compartments; and
5) an electronic monitoring system to regularly inspect the operation of
the system as a whole.
See Teret & Downey, Air Bag Litigation, TRIAL, July 1982, at 93, 93.
5. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981). Auto makers are placed in the position of having to balance public safety con-
cerns against the economic effects on their respective companies. In Grimshaw, a Ford
Pinto was rear-ended, causing the gas tank to explode and engulf the car in flames. Id.
at 773-74, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The Ford Motor Company had decided that it was not
cost effective to modify their 1972 Pinto gas tanks, concluding that a recall of the cars
would be much more expensive than potential exposure to civil liability for the defect.
Id. at 776-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62. As a result of this decision, the jury returned a
verdict against Ford in the amount of $125 million in punitive damages alone. This fig-
ure was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million. Id. at 771-72, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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countless injuries each year.6 Automobile manufacturers, as well as
federal agencies, have repeatedly failed or refused to take the neces-
sary steps toward providing this life-saving protection to the Ameri-
can consumer.
The auto maker's reluctance to install the air bag system has
sparked litigation under the law of products liability. This comment
will analyze whether auto makers may be held liable for failing to
provide air bag protection to consumers who suffer injuries that
could have been prevented had the air bag system been installed.
Next, this comment will discuss the legal bases and strategies utilized
by injured plaintiffs and possible defenses available to auto makers in
regard to such claims. Finally, recent judicial and legislative action
within this controversial new area will be examined.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR BAG ISSUE
The air bag protection system consists of an inflatable device which
is concealed in the dashboard and steering column of the automo-
bile. 7 This device automatically inflates when sensors indicate that
an impact has occurred which exceeds the predetermined decelera-
tion minimum.6 These sensors, located on the front end of the auto-
mobile, register only on impact.9 The air bags inflate from
underneath the dashboard and steering column to protect both the
driver and passenger from a violent impact with the interior of the
automobile. The air bags then rapidly deflate after they have ab-
sorbed the impacting forces of the occupants within the automobile. 1 0
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (the NHTSA)
6. This estimation is based on findings that the air bag system affords the car oc-
cupants greater protection from impacting with the interior of the car (known as the
second collision). Fatalities and serious injuries are primarily the result of the occu-
pants impacting against fixtures within the car, such as the steering wheel, dashboard,
and windshield. Air bags provide protective insulation between such fixtures and the
occupants in an accident. Id.
7. Id. at 93.
8. The air bag system is regarded as a passive restraint system because it requires
no action on the part of the occupants to become operative. Another example of a pas-
sive restraint is the automatic seat belt which is connected to the vehicle door and au-
tomatically secures the passenger when the door is closed. Nonpassive restraint
* systems, such as traditional seat belts, require action on the part of the occupants to
become operative and are otherwise ineffective in offering protection. Id.
9. See infra note 10.
10. Lifsher, Do Air Bags Really Work-and Are They Worth The Cost?, L.A. Daily
J., Apr. 29, 1985, § 1, at 4, col. 3. Air bags are effective in their purpose because they
automatically inflate in frontal collisions exceeding 12 mph, which comprise about
sixty percent of all automobile accidents. Sensors are located under the car's front
bumper; when activated within 1/40th of a second two large cushions inflate with ni-
trogen gas, one located in the steering column and one under the passenger dashboard.
Occupants are thrust forward into the cushions rather than hitting the vehicle's wind-
shield, dashboard, or steering column. The cushions, then, rapidly deflate after such an
impact. Id.
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estimated in 1977, that the installation of passive restraint systems
such as the air bag could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and
over 100,000 injuries annually."1 This estimate was based on substan-
tial on-road experience. 12 Nevertheless, proposed air bag safety stan-
dards have met with political delays as well as strong opposition from
the automobile industry.' 3
In 1953, a United States patent was granted to John W. Hetrick for
his air bag system.' 4 During the 1960's, the system had progressed to
such an advanced technological state that auto makers, as well as
governmental regulatory agencies, were optimistic about its installa-
tion and use.15 By 1969, the National Highway Safety Bureau
(NHSB), responding to congressional concerns over the rapidly in-
creasing national traffic death toll rate, proposed safety standards
which required the lifesaving air bags to be installed in all new
cars.16 However in 1971, the air bag system had become entangled in
a political web and the NHTSA provided for a two year delay in en-
forcing the standards which had been proposed by the NHSB. This
entanglement was primarily due to the auto industry's concerns over
the economic impact of the air bag safety standards on auto
manufacturers.' 7
Legislative success seemed imminent in 1974 when the NHTSA
proposed that the air bag standards should take effect beginning with
11. Coben, Building A Crashworthy Car, TRIAL, July 1985, at 28, 29 (quoting Mo-
tor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983)).
12. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, AUTOMOBILE OC-
CUPANT CRASH PROTECTION, PROGRESS REPORT No. 3 (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as
NHTSA PROGRESS REPORT]. Additionally, since 1969, the Department of Transporta-
tion has conducted over 2,000 crash tests with air bags involving human volunteers and
dummies.
13. Special lobbying groups representing the automobile industry exerted substan-
tial political pressure on the legislature regarding the mandatory implementation of
air bags. This :pressure provided an uphill struggle for proponents of the air bag sys-
tem. See Teret & Downey, supra note 5, at 93, 94.
14. John Hetrick's air bag system was the first of its kind. The system consisted of
*a safety cushion which automatically inflated when the vehicle slowed down. It was
later developed by the auto industry and independent research firms into the present
air bag system. Id. at 93-94.
15. Id. at 9.. "Papers published in automotive engineering journals praised air bag
systems, and at a meeting held in 1968, the government and manufacturers pledged
mutual support of efforts to get air bags into cars." Id.
16. Goins, Product Liability, TRIAL, July 1985, at 74. The proposed restraint stan-
dards set forth by the NHSB (now the NHTSA) provided for the development of
mandatory legislation requiring auto makers to install automatic restraint systems,
such as air bag; or automatic seat belts. Id.
17. Id. (citing INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, AIR BAGS: A CHRONO-
LOGICAL HISTORY OF DELAY 1 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as IIHS]).
1065
the 1977 models.' 8 The agency also provided a cost-benefit analysis
with this proposal which showed that air bags were superior to lap/
shoulder seat belts in lifesaving potential.19 In 1976, Secretary of
Transportation William T. Coleman asserted that the department
had found that air bag systems could save more than 12,000 lives a
year.20 He urged General Motors (GM) and other auto manufactur-
ers to voluntarily begin providing air bags in their automobiles.21
GM agreed to produce, beginning in 1979 and continuing over two
model years, 300,000 cars with the air bag system installed.22 This
agreement never became a reality due to concerns over public accept-
ance of the air bag and GM's poor success with air bag systems mar-
keted in their 1974-76 luxury models.23 However, it is interesting to
note that all of the 1974-76 luxury models that were equipped with
air bags were purchased by consumers during those years.24
In 1977, the newly appointed Secretary of Transportation, Brock
Adams, provided a plan requiring installation of front seat passive re-
straints in all new cars according to model size beginning with 1982
full-size models. 25 But in 1980, this measure was defeated by a vote
in both houses of Congress to block efforts to implement and enforce
the proposed standards.26 In December of 1979, Michigan Representa-
tive David Stockman offered a compromise bill which would allow
consumers to choose between automatic seat belts and air bags.27
Although this legislation was approved by Congress, the Department
of Transportation could not implement the standards until the 1982
model year.28
When it finally appeared that the air bag system had been trans-
formed into a favorable political issue supported by legislators, the
Reagan administration moved into town carrying the banner of gov-
18. Id. (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 2).
19. Id. See also Teret & Downey, supra note 5, at 94.
20. Goins, supra note 16, at 74 (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 3).
21. Id. (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 3). See also Teret & Downey, supra note 5,
at 94-95.
22. Coins, supra note 16, at 74 (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 3). See also Teret &
Downey, supra note 5, at 95.
23. Goins, supra note 16, at 74. Contrary to the expressed concerns of the indus-
try, a 1977 Gallup Poll showed public acceptance of the air bag system as increasing.
See Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 3.
24. Goins, supra note 16, at 74.
25. Id. (citing AUTOMATIC CRASH PROTECTION, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP. NEWS RE-
LEASE, June 30, 1977).
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 5).
28. Id. The Stockman compromise bill was not to become effective until 1982.
"GM took advantage of the congressionally imposed delays and announced that it had
cancelled plans to offer air bags in its 1982 full-sized cars .... Id. (citing IIHS, supra
note 17, at 5).
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ernmental deregulation of the automobile industry.29 As feared by
air bag proponents, the new Secretary of Transportation, Drew
Lewis, proposed a one year postponement of the effective date of the
air bag standard.30 In addition, Raymond Peck, head of the NHTSA,
rescinded the congressionally approved standards proposed by David
Stockman in October, 1981.3 1
Following the NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint stan-
dards, the insurance industry filed a lawsuit in federal court. 32 The
action sought review of the NHTSA's decision to rescind and also
sought a stay of the rescission pending review. In May 1982, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia invali-
dated the recission.33 One year later, the Supreme Court ruled that
the agency's decision to revoke the standard was "arbitrary and capri-
cious" and remanded the issue to the NHTSA for consideration. 34
More recently, in July 1984, Transportation Secretary Elizabeth
Dole proposed a new version of the passive restraint standard which
she intended to use to balance the conflicting interests. The proposed
standard would require all 1990 models to be equipped with either
automatic seat belts or air bags unless states representing two thirds
of the nation's population implemented mandatory seat-belt-use laws
by 1989.35 This rule appeared to provide the impetus needed to effec-
tuate air bag installation in the near future and also raised hopes that
29. Id. The Reagan Administration favored deregulation of the automobile indus-
try to enable American auto makers to remain competitive with foreign
manufacturers.
30. Id.
31. The rescission was said to be based on concerns for cost and public acceptance
of the air bag system. Id. (citing Tolchin, Air Bags and Regulatory Delay, ISSUES IN
Sci. & TECH., Fall 1984, at 67).
32. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
33. Id. at 242. This case was heard ten months before the effective date of the re-
straint standards. These standards required that large and mid-size cars produced af-
ter September 1, 1982, and all cars produced after September 1, 1983, be equipped with
passive restraints such as air bags or automatic seat belts. The circuit court reversed
the NHTSA rescission on the ground that it was arbitrary and was not supported by an
adequate explanation. Id.
34. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46,
57 (1983). The Court agreed with the circuit court's findings, concluding that the
NHTSA's reasoning did not justify rescission and was, therefore, arbitrary and capri-
cious. The Court remanded the case in order for the NHTSA to reconsider its position
on the issue. Id. at 57.
35. Goins, supra note 16, at 74 (citing Tolchin, supra note 31, at 79). Dole's version
of the passive restraint standards was intended to present a compromise between the
automobile manufacturers' concerns and the overwhelming need for public safety in
automobile travel. Id.
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consumers might soon be provided with the lifesaving protection that
air bags can offer.
These hopes proved to be somewhat unrealistic as state legislatures
began to consider mandatory seat belt laws. It now appears that Sec-
retary Dole's version of the passive restraint rule will result in the
installation of air bags or automatic seat belts. Probably enough
states to represent two-thirds of the national population will enact
mandatory seat belt legislation, and will effectively circumvent the
requirement of passive restraints under Dole's rule. The automobile
industry has planned to spend millions of dollars to promote seat belt
legislation among the states. If successful, the industry will not be
required to provide passive restraints in its 1990 model cars.36
As of October 1985, California became the sixteenth state to enact
mandatory seat belt legislation.3 7 Although it is not disputed that
seat belt use will decrease the incidence of death and injuries due to
automobile accidents, it is not the best solution in terms of providing
optimal consumer protection. 38 It appears that the automobile indus-
try may have won another round against the air bag restraint system,
perhaps at the expense of and peril to consumers.
III. THE USE OF ECONOMIC PRESSURES THROUGH LITIGATION To
FORCE AIR BAG STANDARDS
A. The Economic Realities
Perplexing as it is, auto manufacturers and governmental agencies
have either failed or refused to provide the lifesaving technology of
the air bag system to the general public. Indisputably, automobile
manufacturers have the technological means to save countless lives
and to prevent serious injuries. To date, this device is available only
in select Mercedes-Benz models.39
Speculation as to the effectiveness of the air bag system is not nec-
essary. Between 1972 and 1976 there were 12,000 cars produced with
36. Id. (citing IIHS, supra note 17, at 10).
37. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 27315 (West 1985). This represents approximately two-
thirds of the national population, which is enough to essentially "scrap" the chances of
passive restraints under Secretary Dole's rule.
38. See Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 3. The Department of Transportation esti-
mates that if the national seat belt use level reached the fifty percent rate, 4,380 auto-
mobile deaths could be prevented each year. The addition of the air bag system could
more than double this figure. A combination of seat belts and the air bag system are
the most effective restraint yet developed. A resident of Texas is living proof of this
fact. He had purchased a Mercedes-Benz, equipped with an air bag system, which
saved him from certain death after his car flew forty one feet through the air and
smashed nose-first into the bank of a ravine. Id.
39. Id. at 4, col. 4. These Mercedes-Benz models come equipped with the air bag
system at the option of the consumer and are the more expensive type models. How-
ever, Mercedes-Benz is currently considering to offer the system as standard equip-
ment on all models. Id.
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air bag systems. 40 These cars have logged approximately one billion
road miles amd were involved in over 200 crashes severe enough to
trigger the systems, providing a large body of empirical data as to air
bag effectiveness. 41 The reliability of air bag deployment42 and the
actual reduction in deaths and severity of injury to occupants of cars
containing the air bag system are now well established. 43 The on-
road experience of these automobiles has provided an excellent simu-
lation of how air bag systems can work on a much larger scale, if
made available in all automobiles sold in this country.
There is mounting concern that because automobile manufacturers
and governmental agencies have not been successful in paving the
way toward air bag installation, consumers may never receive the
benefit of this lifesaving device. There is, however, a growing trend
to move the air bag issue out of the regulatory agencies and into the
courtroom.
44
B. The Legal Theories
Plaintiffs are attempting to use existing products liability theories
against automobile manufacturers45 by asserting that auto makers
40. Id. at 4, col. 3-4. From 1974 to 1976 GM, Ford and Volvo offered the air bag
system as options in these 12,000 automobiles. Id. at 4, col. 3.
41. There were approximately 250 air bag deployments in this fleet of cars.
"[T]here have been only three inadvertent, on-road deployments; all three occurred in
early, prototype systems, which have since been changed, and none resulted in loss of
control of the car. Two of the inadvertent deployments resulted from the negligence
of garage mechanics in earlier car repairs." Teret & Downey, supra note 5, at 96. See
also Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 3-4. In the Mercedes-Benz models equipped with
the air bag system, there have been nine deployments and " '[in all instances, the sys-
tems have operated as intended.'" Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 4 (quoting Karl-
Heinz Faber, North American Vice President, Mercedes-Benz).
42. Based on the on-road experience of this fleet of automobiles, "The NHTSA es-
timated the reliability of air bag systems to be 99.995 percent or higher." Teret &
Downey, supra note 5, at 96. This figure is impressive in light of the fact that in peri-
odic testing of brake systems, tires, steering and lights, the reliability percentage only
ranges from 86 to 98 percent. Id.
43. "Also using the on-road data from this fleet of cars, there was a 54 percent re-
duction in deaths and a 56 percent reduction in serious or severe injury to occupants in
cars equipped With air bags." Id. (citing NHTSA PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 12). It
is interesting to note that all of these figures are based on everyday real life accidents
and not simulations, making the effectiveness of the air bags even more difficult to re-
but. Id.
44. See Lewin, Lawyers Press Products Liability Air Bag Suits, L.A. Daily J., Nov.
19, 1984, at 14, col. 4.
45. See Annot., 42 A.L.R. 3d 560, 567 (1972). "A manufacturer owes a duty to use
reasonable care in the design of its products to protect against an unreasonable risk of
injury or enhancement of injury to the user of the product." Id. Additionally, the in-
tended use of an automobile includes exposure to foreseeable hazards of collisions and
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should be held strictly liable for deaths and injuries resulting from
their failure to equip cars with air bag protection.46 Plaintiffs are
contending that the manufacturers have placed a product into the
market which is unreasonably dangerous to consumers. 47
The primary legal basis for most air bag suits has been the doctrine
of crashworthiness 48 which provides that a manufacturer may be
held liable for injuries sustained in a vehicular accident due to a de-
fect that was perhaps not the cause of the accident, but which en-
hanced the degree of the injuries suffered in the accident.49 This
impacts. Therefore, recovery against automobile manufacturers should not be limited
to situations where the defect in design was the causative factor in the accident, be-
cause the accident and resulting injury, which is usually caused by the "second-colli-
sion" of the occupant with the interior of the car, are both foreseeable. Id. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1966):
A manufacturer of chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dan-
gerous for the uses for which it is manufactured, is subject to liability to
others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its
probable use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.
Id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966). The Restatement pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property
(2) The rule . . . applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product ....
Id.
Although this doctrine is not easily applied, some states have adopted their own ver-
sions of the strict liability doctrine. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.2, at 5. Dif-
fering interpretations have resulted and courts and attorneys are still wrestling with
the definition of "defective" and the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement. Id.
47. See Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 4. The argument is that cars which are not
equipped with air bags or other passive restraint systems are unreasonably dangerous.
An additional theory is that "the companies were negligent in failing to exercise due
care to make a crashworthy product." Id. See also infra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text.
48. See Annot., 42 A.L.R. 3d 560, 567 (1972). Auto manufacturers are under a duty
to use reasonable care in designing their products. They must protect against an un-
reasonable risk of injury or enhancement of injury to the user of the product. Id. Basi-
cally, this duty involves designing and producing automobiles so as to reduce the risk
of injury to occupants of the car in the event of an accident.
49. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.4, at 7. See also Dyson v. General Motors
Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The court, in Dyson, held that it is the auto-
mobile manufacturer's obligation "to provide more than merely a moving platform ca-
pable of transporting passengers from one point to another. The passengers must be
provided a reasonably safe container within which to make the journey." Id. at 1073.
In Dyson, the plaintiff was injured when the automobile left the roadway and tipped,
causing the roof to partially collapse. The defective roof did not cause the injury, but
rather it enhanced the risk of injury. Id. at 1065, 1072-73. Because vehicular accidents
are so common they constitute a reasonably foreseeable use of the car, and automobile
manufacturers have a duty to provide protection. Id. at 1072-73. See also Grundmanis
v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970). An automobile manufacturer
must accept the duty to protect the user from unreasonable risk of injury in automo-
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doctrine places a duty upon auto manufacturers to design
automobiles which protect occupants not only from the impact of the
first collision (between the automobile and another object) but also
from the impact of the second collision (between the occupants and
the interior of the car).50
The doctrine of crashworthiness is relevant to both negligence and
strict liability causes of action. The basic premise is that an automo-
bile manufacturer must design its product so that it is safe from any
reasonably foreseeable use, which includes automobile accidents. 51
C. The Cases
The landmark case which provided the foundation for the automo-
bile manufacturers' duty to make automobiles safe is Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corporation.52 The court ruled that auto makers have a
duty to provide a safe means of transportation, or as safe as is reason-
ably possible under the present state of the art technology.53 Clearly,
the intended use of an automobile contemplates the foreseeable
hazards of collisions and impacts.5 4 Thus, the court held that automo-
bile manufacturers may be held liable for injuries, including those
which are enhanced from the manufacturers' failure to use reason-
able care to avoid unreasonable risks of injury from accidents. The
Larsen opinion focused on the very essence of air bag claims. It "per-
ceive[d] of no sound reason, either in logic or in experience, nor any
command in precedent, why the manufacturer should not be held to
a reasonable duty of care in the design of its vehicle consonant with
the state of the art to minimize the effect of accidents." 55
The federal courts have held that collisions are reasonably foresee-
bile collisions due to their knowledge of the foreseeability of auto accidents. Id. at 304-
05 (quoting Lar,;en v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-03 (8th Cir. 1968)).
50. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.4, at 7. See also Mickle v. Blackmun, 252
S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) (An automobile maker owes a duty of care to reasonably
minimize the risks of death or serious injury to collision victims who upon impact,
quite predictably, would be forcefully thrown against the interior of the car or outside
of it.).
51. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.4, at 7. See also supra note 48.
52. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). This case involved an action against an automo-
bile manufacturer for injuries resulting from a design defect in the steering assembly
of the car. Id. aL 496. The court held that the design was unreasonably dangerous and
had enhanced the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 504-05.
53. Id. at 502.
54. Id. at 502-03.
55. Id. at 503.
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able when automobiles are used for their intended purpose.56 Cur-
rent air bag lawsuits rely on the fact that air bag systems have been
functional for over a decade and should be considered within the
realm of state of the art protection.5 7 While proponents of the air bag
system argue that automobile manufacturers have placed unrealisti-
cally high price estimates on air bag installation costs,5 8 studies indi-
cate that installation of air bag systems would not place an
unreasonable economic burden on auto manufacturers. 59 The De-
partment of Transportation, in 1983, estimated that such devices
should cost no more than $320 per automobile.60 In fact, in 1978,
General Motors had estimated,that with mandatory installation and
increased volume production of air bag systems to the millions of
units, the cost of each system would be just $96.61
Plaintiffs attempt to show that air bags should be considered in
tests for crashworthiness, and that as a result of the industry's failure
to provide this lifesaving protection, it should be accountable for
deaths and injuries which could have been prevented by the air bag
system.62 The statistics which reveal the number of deaths and inju-
ries resulting from automobile accidents each year are alarming.63
Consumers are understandably angered over the automobile indus-
try's failure or refusal to provide an existing protection system that
could prevent such crippling injuries.
IV. THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY'S ASSERTED DEFENSES
A. The Air Bag's Unproven Reliability and Lack of Public Appeal
Plaintiffs' attorneys are hoping that juries will be persuaded that
automobile manufacturers should be held liable for the seemingly
unnecessary human loss and suffering resulting from car accidents.
However, the automobile industry is not backing down. Manufactur-
ers assert that air bags have not proven to be reliable and that inad-
56. See generally Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981); Dawson
v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
57. Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 4.
58. Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 6.
59. See Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 6; Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 4.
60. Id. One of the misconceptions regarding the air bag system has been the un-
realistic price estimates with which automobile manufacturers have attempted to mis-
lead the general public. The industry estimates the extra cost of the system to be
$1200 per automobile. Id. at 4, col. 5.
61. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at § 1.7, at 16.
62. See Lewin, supra note 4, at 14, col. 4. See also supra notes 48-51 and accompa-
nying text.
63. See Time For 'Passive Restraint', supra note 1, at 4, col. 1. Each year it is esti-
mated that 44,000 Americans are killed and 2 million are seriously injured in traffic
accidents. Id. Additionally, approximately 114,000 severe facial lacerations and 25,000
facial fractures result each year from auto accidents. Teret & Downey, supra note 5, at
99 (citing INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, 16 STATUS REPORT (1981)).
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vertent deployments are potentially hazardous to car occupants. 64
They also contend that the general public does not desire the system
and does not want to be subjected to price increases which the air bag
system would entail.65 However, German manufacturer Mercedes-
Benz offered the air bag restraint system as an option on select 1984
models. Company officials were so impressed with the results of the
system, as well as public response, that they are now considering
making the system a standard feature on all Mercedes-Benz
automobile,;.66
Air bag advocates disagree with the automobile industry's assertion
that there is a lack of public interest in the air bag system. The advo-
cates contend that manufacturers have never made a full-faith effort
to market the safety device.67 Advocates refer, for example, to a 1977
Gallup Poll and a 1980 New York Times Poll which revealed that
nearly half of all drivers favored air bag installation.68
Automobile manufacturers have claimed that the air bag system
protects only against front-end collisions and not against side and
rear collisions.69 Proponents of the system agree that the air bag sys-
tem will not be effective in all types of accidents. It is primarily
designed to provide occupant protection only in the event of frontal
collisions. 70 Proponents rebut the industry's argument with a quota-
tion from the NHTSA: "To say air cushions are a poor idea because
they do not provide protection from all types of crash injuries is like
arguing that polio vaccine shouldn't be used because it doesn't cure
cancer."
71
64. Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 3-5.
65. Id. at 4, col. 5.
66. Id. at 4, col. 4. Company officials of Mercedes-Benz boast that, to date, they
have experienced nine air bag deployments, and in all instances the system operated
successfully. Tests also have indicated that the system will not inadvertently deploy
and inflate with full braking power of the car applied at high speeds. Id. See also
supra note 39, 41 and accompanying text.
67. Lifsher, supra note 10, at 4, col. 6.
68. Id. The polls also found that 65 percent of drivers under age 35 favored air
bags. Id. These statistics showed the system's acceptability to a large percentage of the
population. Perhaps, the reason these statistics are not higher is due to the public's
lack of knowledge about air bags, rather than its disapproval of them.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4, col. 5.
71. Id. at 4, col. 6. Proponents of the air bag system have also asserted that the
combined use of lap seat belts and air bags would protect drivers against most acci-
dents. Id. Proponents argue that even though the air bags will not afford protection in
all types of collisions, 60 percent of all accidents involve frontal impact. Thus in at
least 60 percent of all accidents the occupants are better protected. Id. at 4, col. 3.
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B. The Automobile Manufacturers' Compliance with Existing
Federal Safety Standards
Automobile manufacturers assert that they have violated no fed-
eral regulations by not providing air bags. To the contrary, they be-
lieve they have complied with all safety standards set out by the
NHTSA. However, it should be pointed out that the failure of the
federal government to require this lifesaving device does not serve to
exempt automobile manufacturers from their common law duty to
provide a reasonably safe product under state of the art technology. 72
Other federal motor vehicle standards have been held to represent
only a minimum duty of care. "[A] manufacturer's compliance with
these standards is not conclusive on the question of a manufacturer's
liability." 73 Standards can also become outdated and fail to respond
to new technology. Thus, automobile manufacturers have a common
law duty to act reasonably in providing safe transportation to the
public. This duty should include equipping cars with safety devices of
proven effectiveness, such as the air bag system.7 4
C. Seat Belts Satisfy the Automobile Manufacturer's Duty to
Provide a Reasonably Safe Product.
Seat belts are often an effective means of occupant protection,
when used. Automobile manufacturers, however, are aware of the
fact that only eleven percent of all car occupants use them.75 A ques-
tion that merits further analysis is whether the provision of seat belts
by automobile manufacturers satisfies the reasonably-safe-product
duty owed to the consumer.76 Manufacturers maintain that cars are
reasonably safe provided that consumers use the seat belts and this
satisfies the duty of care owed by them. However, it may be argued
that this assertion is perhaps not entirely logical or consistent, and
fails to recognize which party owes a duty to render the product rea-
sonably safe.
The provision of seat belts in automobiles has the ultimate effect of
shifting the responsibility to the consumer to render the automobile
reasonably safe. The consumer is placed in the position of having to
choose whether or not the car will provide accident protection each
72. See Teret & Downey, supra note 5, at 96-97. "The National Traffic Motor Ve-
hicle and Safety Act of 1966 [15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982)], under which safety stan-
dards are promulgated, expressly states that 'compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law.'" Id. at 99 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982)).
73. Id. (citing Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975); Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Roberts v. May,
583 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1978)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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time he and his family drives the automobile. This shifting of re-
sponsibility exemplifies the fact that the automobile industry has not
produced cars that are reasonably safe, but rather, cars which
"could" be safe, depending upon whether or not the consumer
chooses to buckle up.
Products liability law provides that manufacturers owe a duty to
provide a reasonably safe product,77 not a product that provides an
optional "self-service" protection system. It may be argued that the
consumer does not owe a duty to render the product safe for his own
use. Therefore, why permit automobile manufacturers to place the
consumer in such a position? It is generally agreed that the use of a
seat belt is not overly cumbersome. However, if the consumer either
refuses or forgets to use the seat belt, he is now using a product that
is unreasonably dangerous. Automobiles, as produced today, do not
provide occupants with accident protection. It is conspicuously the re-
sponsibility of the consumer to render the automobile reasonably
safe. If automobiles were equipped with air bag protection systems,
automobile manufacturers could then maintain the position that the
cars are reasonably safe in and of themselves without having to rely
upon the contingency of consumers' affirmative actions.
The foreseeable use doctrine of products liability law imposes a
duty on manufacturers to provide protection for both foreseeable
uses and foreseeable misuses of the product.78 The nonuse of seat
belts would qualify as a foreseeable unintended use of the automo-
bile. As such, automobile manufacturers would have a legal duty to
protect consumers from the dangers of using the automobile without
a seat belt by providing secondary passive restraint devices such as
air bags or automatic seat belts.
77. See ,upra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
78. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 428-29, 573 P.2d 443,
453-54, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235 (1978). The liability of a manufacturer for injuries caused
by its product does not depend upon a finding that the manufacturer should have fore-
seen the precise manner in which a person might be injured. Nor is it necessary for a
plaintiff to show that the buyer utilized the product in a manner intended by the
maker. It i; sufficient that the use be a foreseeable one even though it was unin-
tended. Id. See also Calkins v. Sandven, 129 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1964). The Calkins court
rejected the defendant's argument that their design of a wagon was sufficient to guard
against the reasonable probability of harm to users. Plaintiff had sustained injuries as
a result of stumbling and catching his hand in a six inch opening of the wagon. De-
fendants maintained that this use of the wagon was unintended. The court held that it
was reasonably foreseeable that someone might be hurt due to the defendants' failure
to guard the opening, and that it did not matter whether the injury occurred pursuant
to an unintended use as long as such use was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 8.
1075
D. Conformity with Industry Custom
Automobile manufacturers have also asserted the defense of compli-
ance with industry custom. They argue that it is not presently the
custom of the automobile industry to offer air bag systems in
automobiles. However, this is not a very strong assertion because it
has been held that the reasonableness of an industry custom itself is
always open to question.79 When an industry decides to withhold a
protective device from the public, that custom itself may be found to
constitute negligence.8 0
In the case of The TJ. Hooper,8' the court established the rule re-
garding compliance with industry custom. The case involved the de-
fendant's failure to equip its tugboat with a radio capable of receiving
weather reports. The T.J. Hooper had been hired to transport plain-
tiff's barge which ultimately sank due to bad weather. Plaintiff con-
tended that this would not have occurred if The T.J. Hooper had
been equipped with a weather radio. Judge Hand found the defend-
ant negligent, notwithstanding the industry custom of equipping such
vessels with weather radios. Judge Hand stated:
[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and avail-
able devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so impera-
tive that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.8 2
It appears, perhaps with the exception of select Mercedes-Benz mod-
els, that the automobile industry as a whole has "unduly lagged" in
providing the air bag system, which has statistically been demon-
strated as the type of occupant protection system needed in present
day automobile travel.
V. THE DOCTRINE OF CRASHWORTHINESS AND AIR BAGS
Air bags are designed and have been proven to increase automobile
crashworthiness in frontal collisions. Since it is firmly established
that automobile manufacturers have a duty to build reasonably safe
cars, based on state-of-the-art technology and feasibility considera-
tions,8 3 the only remaining inquiry of concern in this area of the law
is whether an automobile manufacturer who has not installed air
bags has fully complied with that duty. Based on traditional tort
principles, this issue should be resolved by a jury.8 4
In Larsen, the court concluded that automobile manufacturers
79. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
80. See Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339
(1978).
81. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
82. Id. at 740.
83. See Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503. See also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
84. Coben, supra note 11, at 30.
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have a duty to provide a reasonably safe automobile. This rule has
been adopted in virtually all jurisdictions which have addressed the
crashworthiness issue.85 In Fox v. Ford Motor Company,8 6 the plain-
tiffs were injured when, as passengers in the back seat of the automo-
bile, they were catapulted in an accident. They struck the back of
the front seat even though they had been wearing lap seat belts. The
seat belts afforded inadequate protection. As a result, the plaintiffs
impacted with the interior of the car, incurring serious injuries and
death.87
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the plaintiffs' cause
of action based upon the crashworthiness doctrine.8 8 The court ruled
that a legitimate jury issue existed as to whether defendant Ford
would be liable for failing to provide shoulder harness seat belts in
the back seat of the car. This issue existed despite the fact that none
of the American manufacturers had provided such protective meas-
ures in 1970 automobiles.89 Expert testimony had been introduced
that the automobile was defective without the back seat shoulder
harness. The court stated that the absence of rear shoulder har-
nesses presented a valid claim, and "the jury could find that it cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of injury." 90
The crashworthiness doctrine has been applied to a variety of pas-
sive restraint systems based either on their absence or inadequacy.
For example, in Buccery v. General Motors Corp.,91 the California
Court of Appeal reversed entry of a nonsuit and held that there was
substantial evidence to support plaintiff's crashworthiness claim
based on General Motors' failure to provide a head restraint which
would prevent injury from a rear-end impact.92 This decision con-
cluded that when a vehicle does not include viable safety designs to
protect against foreseeable injuries, the manufacturer may be found
85. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., Ltds, 655 F.2d 650, 655 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Florida law requires manufacturers to design and produce cars that eliminate unrea-
sonable risk of foreseeable injury); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110 (7th
Cir. 1977) (Indiana Supreme Court would adopt the rule that a manufacturer of
automobiles owes a duty to make their products reasonably fit for intended purposes,
which includes potentiality for collisions); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir.
1976) (New Jersey law requires automobile manufacturers to take reasonable steps to
design and produce cars that will minimize unavoidable danger).
86. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 777.
88. Id. at 780-81.
89. Id. at 788-89.
90. Id. at 784.
91. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
92. Id. at 550-51, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
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liable for failure to design a crashworthy automobile.93
The plaintiff in Turner v. General Motors Corp.94 succeeded on his
crashworthiness claim by showing that his car was not designed with
a roll bar or roll cage, which would have mitigated the injuries he
suffered when his car rolled over and the roof of the car crushed
him. The Texas Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling
that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action. 95 It was estab-
lished that no mass-produced automobile in the United States had
been manufactured with a roll bar or cages, and it was further shown
that the roofs of G.M.'s automobiles were no more unsafe than the
roofs of other vehicles of the same year.96 The court held that the
industry custom of not installing such safety devices, even though
they were readily available, showed that the custom itself was unrea-
sonably dangerous.97
More recently, in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.,98 the court upheld a
finding of liability based on a commonly used car frame that resulted
in a police officer's quadriplegia. The officer's car skidded into a tele-
phone pole after he lost control of the vehicle. The car frame was
determined to be unreasonably dangerous, despite the fact that it was
commonly used within the industry.99 The same logic could be ap-
plied to the air bag system.
It seems that one of the keys to recovery under a crashworthiness
claim is the showing of a feasibly safe design feature that would have
prevented or reduced the extent of the injuries sustained. Cases have
held that evidence of a safety device that would protect against a
product's propensity to create a danger is sufficient to present a ques-
tion for the jury.100 Once the issue is brought, injured plaintiffs may
obtain the jury's sympathy which could prove to be a key factor in
the outcome of such a case.
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN AIR BAG LITIGATION
Numerous air bag lawsuits have been brought before the courts re-
cently. Plaintiffs argue that the air bag system should be considered
in the court's crashworthiness analysis. Although some air bag cases
have proceeded to trial, to date, none have reached a decision by the
93. See Coben, supra note 11, at 31.
94. 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
95. Id. at 507.
96. Id. at 506.
97. Id. at 506-07.
98. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 960.
100. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ford Motor Co., 124 Ariz. 158, 602 P.2d 826 (1979) (the
lack of rollover protection and the tendency of the vehicle to overturn raised an issue
of fact of whether it was unreasonably dangerous).
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trier of fact.1O1 However, this fact is misleading because many cases
have resulted in settlement agreements before being presented to the
judge or jury.10 2
In Burgess v. Ford Motor Co.,103 Ford was sued by a woman who
had suffered severe brain damage. The 1975 Ford Pinto in which she
was riding as a front seat passenger, and which was not equipped
with air bag safety restraints, was struck by a Camaro in a front-an-
gle intersection collision. Plaintiff claimed that the lack of an air bag
protection system had rendered the 1975 Pinto uncrashworthy.1 04 A
large class action suit has been brought in Florida seeking damages of
$25 million on behalf of all recent accident victims in Florida, based
on the lack of air bag protection.10 5 Plaintiff's lawyers argue that it
is unnecessary and illogical for people to be killed and physically im-
paired as a result of automobile accidents when auto manufacturers
have the present means to prevent such tragedy. 0 6
It is interesting to consider why automobile manufacturers have
chosen to settle particular claims before they go to trial. Is the auto-
mobile industry concerned about a possible adverse judgment in an
air bag action? Do they fear the floodgate effect of the countless
other injured plaintiffs that may seek judicial satisfaction for their
injuries? Although the automobile industry is perhaps fearing an ad-
verse judgment, they are not backing down. However, air bag plain-
tiffs remain optimistic that consumer actions, such as lawsuits, will
strongly impact the future of automobile safety standards in this
country. It seems that the focus of judicial concern is how to regulate
the flow of potential liability against auto makers. Concerns for
costs, technology, and marketability are primary considerations in
providing a safe product. However, evidence demonstrates that air
bag systems are feasible with respect to all three of these concerns.
It is the plaintiff's burden to persuade the court of these facts by
providing the empirical data that supports this assertion. Even if a
court rules for a particular plaintiff in an air bag suit, it would seem
101. Frank, Pumped-up Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1985, at 22, 22.
102. Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 6.
103. Civ. Action No. CV 79-3515 (cited in Frank, supra note 101, at 22).
104. Id. The settlement in this case is the largest to be divulged, amounting to $1.8
million. Id. Ford has also persuaded a court to seal 5,000 pages of documents, cost
studies, and crash tests which the plaintiff's attorney was using to show that Ford
could have used air bags to avoid injuries like those suffered by the plaintiff. See
Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 6.
105. See Lewin, supra note 44, at 14, col. 6.
106. See id.
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unrealistic or illogical to say that this would subject automobile man-
ufacturers to liability for claims by all injured plaintiffs. Each plain-
tiff remains obligated to prove that his particular injuries resulted
from the defendant's failure to build a crashworthy and reasonably
safe automobile. Plaintiffs must also show that the injuries sustained
and the type of accident involved are the kind that an air bag system
would have prevented.107
In Evers v. General Motors,lO8 the U.S. District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of GM.
Plaintiff was injured when the car he was driving was struck by a
Toyota. The Toyota was traveling at approximately 30 miles per
hour when it hit plaintiff's car. The impact of the collision caused
both a crippling pelvic injury and permanent brain damage to plain-
tiff. Plaintiff's liability claim alleged a defect in the passenger re-
straint system and a defect resulting from GM's failure to install an
air bag system. The district court in granting summary judgment
found that plaintiff's claim of defect in the restraint system was un-
supported by any evidence that a defect existed or contributed to
plaintiff's injuries.
This case was recently appealed and decided before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in which the court affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment.109 The court based its
decision on the finding that appellant had not provided any specific
facts to support its claim. Additionally, the court noted the fact that
two of the plaintiff's experts had sharply conflicted as to their opin-
ions with respect to air bag protection.110
The Evers case demonstrates that not all cases involve fact patterns
that would qualify under air bag analysis. In such cases plaintiffs
will be limited in establishing liability. Fact patterns must be suita-
ble to pursue a remedy under the air bag theory. Because air bag liti-
gation is relatively new, plaintiffs must be alert to the types of
theories and arguments that are meeting with approval before the
courts.
107. Coben, supra note 11, at 33. Such claims would further be limited to cases
strictly involving frontal impacts since the air bag system is only deployed in such acci-
dents. Id.
108. No. 84 Civ. 3619 (M.D.F. Oct. 20, 1985) (official cite presently unavailable).
109. Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 986. Plaintiff had presented an affidavit of one of their experts that had
testified, that in his opinion, an air bag system would probably have reduced the sever-
ity of or prevented plaintiff's injuries. The court noted, however, that this testimony
had contradicted the earlier deposition of plaintiff's expert Dr. Huelke, who had ex-
plained that air bags are not designed to provide protection against side impacts.
Plaintiff's case did involve a side impact type collision. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In late 1980, shortly before the end of her term, NHTSA adminis-
trator Joan Claybrook wrote executives of the major auto companies
urging them to adopt certain safety features within their
automobiles. One such suggestion involved the concern for air bag
protections, in which she wrote:
Air Bags-Not since 1976, when GM stopped selling cars equipped with air
bags, has the American public been given a chance to purchase at any price, a
new car built with air bag automatic crash protection. This choice of an unob-
trusive and potentially superior crash protection system has been denied the
American public for far too long at a great expense in lives and injuries.1 1 1
It is apparent that despite attempts to influence legislators, as well
as auto makers, to provide air bag protection to the American public,
the air bag's future remains uncertain. Recently, facts surrounding
the air bag issue have been exposed and are now subject to review by
the Americam public. The consumer should prove to be a valuable
ally for the air bag system and should have a significant impact upon
its eventual implementation.
A final question is which branch of the government will take the
first steps toward mandating air bags as part of automobile safety
standards. Due to the current exposure of related air bag facts, auto
makers will probably take it upon themselves to offer air bag re-
straint systems in the near future, followed by federal regulations re-
quiring thera. The basic premise that you can't hide the facts and
evidence from the public forever has proved to be true in regard to
the long-awaited air bag protection system.
FRANK WATERS
111. R. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
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